The article was drafted by Andreas Papastathis,Partner & Ioanna Toufexi, Associate for Lexology on October 19,2026

How the rising curtailment is reshaping project economics, compensation claims and the investability of renewable projects

Introduction

Curtailment, which involves the deliberate reduction or temporary shutdown of renewable energy generation when the electricity grid is unable to accommodate the available output, has evolved in Greece from a primarily technical grid-management measure into a significant legal, commercial and financing risk for renewable energy producers. The central question is no longer simply how much generation is being curtailed, but how each restriction is legally classified. Not every curtailment is “redispatching” under EU law, and not every loss of injection gives rise to compensation. Where a measure does qualify as non-market redispatch requested by a system operator, Article 13(7) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 may provide an autonomous right to economic compensation, subject in particular to the contractual status of the connection and the specific non-firm delivery exception.

The Scale of the Problem in Greece

Curtailment in Greece is escalating faster than most forecasts anticipated. In the first four months of 2026 it reached 876.5 GWh, up 49% year-on-year, while the number of hours with zero or negative prices jumped from 13 to 239.5. In April 2026 alone, revenue losses for small and medium-sized solar producers touched 65% compared with the previous year. This is a structural deterioration rather than a one-off event: the peaks systematically occur during the hours of maximum solar output, precisely when the market value of that energy falls to zero or turns negative.

A technical study presented to the Ministry of Environment and Energy (YPEN) estimates that solar plants under Greece’s Feed-in Premium contracts will lose, on average, 41-42% of their theoretical revenue over 2026-2031, peaking at almost 50% in 2027. Wind plants, with a more balanced generation profile across the day, are affected less severely (around 21% on average), making the problem particularly acute for the large pool of small and medium-sized solar investors.

Consequences for Businesses

The economic fallout is now tangible and multi-layered. Loans for solar projects, traditionally regarded as among the most reliable in the Greek banking system because of predictable support revenues, are showing signs of credit stress. Curtailment is therefore no longer confined to producers’ balance sheets: it can affect projected cash flows, debt-service coverage ratios and, ultimately, project bankability and the exposure of lenders that financed the renewables investment wave of the past decade. For project-finance purposes, curtailment assumptions can no longer be treated as a peripheral consideration in financial modelling and risk assessment. They increasingly affect base-case revenue forecasts, covenant headroom and refinancing risk.

At the same time, a clear trend toward market concentration is emerging. Small and medium-sized producers, often with limited access to storage, business diversification or bargaining power, are more exposed to prolonged revenue pressure and may be pushed toward project disposals at depressed valuations. Larger, diversified groups are better able to absorb that risk and may strengthen their position through acquisitions and strategic partnerships. If persistent, this dynamic may work against the original policy objective of energy decentralisation that underpinned support for smaller renewable producers.

A further asymmetry is deepening the debate: while producers face lost output and periods of zero or negative prices, suppliers may benefit from low-price hours without an equivalent benefit necessarily flowing through to affected generators. This has prompted discussion of exceptional redistributive measures. The more fundamental legal question, however, is whether the existing framework already allocates part of the curtailment loss to the system operator in defined cases.

Curtailment also exposes a gap in conventional insurance architecture. The generating asset may remain fully operational and undamaged while revenue is lost because injection is restricted by an operator instruction. Traditional business-interruption cover, which is commonly triggered by insured physical damage, may therefore not respond. This creates scope for non-damage business-interruption or parametric solutions, but any such product would need to distinguish carefully between losses recoverable from the system operator under Article 13(7), losses excluded by a non-firm connection, market-based redispatch and restrictions that do not qualify as redispatching at all. Policy design would also need to address double recovery and, where appropriate, subrogation or assignment of the producer’s claim.

The Legal Framework: Redispatching, Article 13 and Greek Article 10C

The starting point is the EU concept of “redispatching”. Article 2(26) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 expressly defines redispatching as a measure, including curtailment, activated by one or more transmission or distribution system operators through an alteration of generation, load patterns or both, in order to change physical flows in the electricity system, relieve physical congestion or otherwise ensure system security. Curtailment should therefore be understood within the broader legal concept of redispatching rather than as a distinct regulatory category. In other words, curtailment is one form of redispatching where the conditions laid down in Article 2(26) are met. The legal analysis must therefore focus not merely on whether output has been curtailed, but on whether the intervention constitutes redispatching within the meaning of Regulation 2019/943. Zero or negative prices, oversupply or a producer’s economic decision not to inject do not, by themselves, amount to redispatching. What matters is who activated the measure, why it was activated and whether the intervention was aimed at the physical operation or security of the grid.

Article 13 gives priority to market-based redispatch. Non-market-based downward redispatch is exceptional and, for renewable installations, may be used only under the conditions set out in the Regulation, with particular emphasis on necessity, the absence of a suitable market-based alternative, justification and transparency. This creates two distinct legal questions: whether the choice of a non-market measure was lawful and, separately, whether the producer is entitled to compensation. Even a lawful curtailment imposed as a necessary system-security measure may still trigger Article 13(7). Conversely, a restriction is not compensable merely because it reduces injection: the measure must qualify as non-market redispatch requested by the relevant system operator, and the specific exception for producers that have accepted non-firm delivery must also be considered.

The firm/non-firm distinction is therefore a critical contractual filter. A general clause allowing the operator to impose technical restrictions or emergency instructions should not automatically be equated with acceptance of a connection without guaranteed firm delivery. The actual connection offer and connection agreement, the regulatory basis of the restrictions and the scope of the access right granted to the producer all require examination. Equally, a producer’s position may be weaker where the restriction is attributable to its own technical non-compliance or missing mandatory monitoring or remote-control equipment.

Greek law adds a further layer. Article 10C of Law 4951/2022, introduced by Law 5188/2025, provides liability exclusions for the competent transmission and distribution operators in respect of specified curtailment orders imposed for the safe operation of the system or network. Crucially, however, Article 10C(4) expressly states that those national exclusions do not prejudice rights arising under Article 13(7) of Regulation 2019/943. The better reading is therefore one of delimitation rather than conflict: the national liability exclusions operate outside, but cannot extinguish, an autonomous EU right to compensation where the conditions of Article 13(7) are met. The use of national concepts such as force majeure cannot, by itself, determine whether a measure falls within the autonomous EU concept of redispatching.

That distinction is important procedurally as well as substantively. A claim under Article 13(7) is not simply an ordinary tort or contractual damages claim against the operator. The liability exclusions in Article 10C(1)-(3) may affect claims based on domestic civil-liability rules, whereas Article 13(7), where applicable, operates as a distinct EU-law entitlement to economic compensation and is expressly preserved by Article 10C(4). For future disputes, the cause of action and the legal characterisation of the restriction may therefore matter as much as the amount of the loss.

The calculation of compensation is equally case-specific. Article 13(7) uses prescribed economic benchmarks rather than a single flat payment per curtailed MWh. In the case of downward redispatch, the net revenues that the installation would have earned from the day-ahead market are relevant, and financial support linked to the volume of electricity generated or consumed may also form part of the calculation. The exercise is therefore not identical to a general claim for lost profits: it requires a counterfactual assessment of the economic position of the particular installation within the methodology laid down by the Regulation, while avoiding both unduly low and unduly high compensation.

This also makes transparency and evidence central. A producer should be able to establish the timing and duration of each instruction, the curtailed volume, the reason for activation and the basis on which restrictions were allocated among installations. Article 13(7) attributes compensation to the “system operator requesting the redispatching”, which may matter where one operator requests a measure and another technically implements it. Quantifying the counterfactual production, in turn, should be based on plant-specific technical evidence, such as recorded operator set-points, contemporaneous solar or wind resource data, power curves and actual technical availability, rather than generic performance assumptions. Without access to sufficiently granular operational data, both the legality of the intervention and the quantum of any claim become materially harder to test.

Any national compensation mechanism should therefore be understood as an implementation or allocation tool, not as a substitute for rights that may already arise directly under Article 13(7). Its design must also remain distinct from the rules governing operating support during periods of negative prices and must be tested against the EU State aid framework. A loss of support because market prices are negative is legally different from compensation for non-market redispatch, even if both phenomena can affect the same project during the same period.

You can read the full article here: https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=f58b50b9-26b4-4cd6-9b94-b724d3aa71fe

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The article was authored by Ioanna Toufexi, Associate & Andreas Papastathis,Partner for Lexology on 23 September 2026

Introduction

The development of offshore wind energy has become one of the key pillars of the global energy transition. The need to reduce reliance on fossil fuels, achieve climate neutrality targets and enhance energy security has driven governments and investors worldwide to accelerate the deployment of large-scale offshore wind projects.

At the same time, however, the development of such projects raises complex environmental and regulatory challenges. Offshore wind farms are developed within marine ecosystems that often present significant ecological value, while also accommodating multiple competing uses. As a result, ensuring the protection of marine biodiversity, migratory bird routes, marine mammals and other sensitive ecosystems has become a central element of the regulatory framework governing these investments.

Against this background, Decision No. 880/2026 of the Athens Administrative Court of Appeal is of particular interest beyond the specific circumstances of the case. Its significance does not lie solely in its impact on the first pilot offshore wind projects developed in Greece, but also in the broader question it raises for energy transition law worldwide: how can the necessary acceleration of renewable energy projects be achieved without weakening fundamental environmental safeguards?

At the same time, the decision highlights a critical issue for the investment community. The successful development of large-scale energy projects does not depend solely on technological maturity or financial viability, but also on the existence of a clear, predictable and stable regulatory framework capable of providing long-term certainty.

The case concerned research permits granted for two pilot offshore wind projects with a combined capacity of approximately 600 MW in the marine area northeast of the island of Samothrace, Greece. These projects were of particular importance, as they represented the first practical implementation stage of Greece’s newly established offshore wind regulatory framework and were expected to serve as a foundation for the further development of the sector.

The Court’s decision did not question offshore wind development as a strategic energy policy objective, nor did it declare Law 4964/2022 unconstitutional in its entirety. On the contrary, the Court expressly acknowledged that the development of renewable energy sources constitutes a legitimate objective under both constitutional and EU law and that offshore wind forms part of Greece’s national energy priorities. Ιts core message concerns the relationship between accelerated energy development and environmental legality: the transition towards clean energy must take place within a framework that ensures proper planning and timely assessment of environmental impacts. Its criticism was directed instead at the procedural sequence followed in the case of the pilot projects, namely the decision to allow research activities to proceed before completion of the strategic planning process. In that sense, the judgment does not call into question the State’s policy choice to promote offshore wind as an instrument of the energy transition;  rather, it requires that this policy be implemented in compliance with the constitutional safeguards of environmental protection, including proper spatial planning and timely environmental assessment.

Research Activities as Part of the Environmental Planning of the Project

The central issue examined in the case was not whether offshore wind farms constitute an acceptable form of energy development, but rather at what stage environmental protection requirements must become applicable.

The Court approached the research permit not as a purely technical procedure aimed solely at collecting data, but as part of a broader sequence of actions ultimately leading to the siting and development of an offshore wind project. Under this approach, the research phase could not be considered entirely separate from the future installation and operation of offshore wind facilities.

The Court read Law 4964/2022 as establishing a strict and sequential planning process. In its view, before research permits could be issued, the National Offshore Wind Development Programme, the strategic environmental assessment and the delimitation of the relevant Offshore Wind Farm Organised Development Areas and First Choice Areas had to be completed. The research permit was therefore treated as part of the overall spatial and environmental planning sequence rather than as an isolated preliminary act.

This reasoning is particularly significant because it places environmental assessment at an earlier stage of project development. Environmental protection is not activated only when construction begins or when direct physical intervention in the environment takes place. Rather, it becomes relevant from the moment decisions are adopted that may determine the future course and viability of a project.

This approach reflects a broader trend in modern environmental law, according to which preventing environmental harm is generally considered more effective than attempting to remedy damage after it has occurred. Particularly in marine ecosystems, where impacts may be difficult or impossible to reverse, the early identification and assessment of potential risks acquire increased importance.

The Principles of Prevention and Precaution in the Energy Transition

A central aspect of the decision is its reliance on the principles of prevention and precaution. These principles require potential environmental risks to be addressed at an early stage and prevent scientific uncertainty from being used to postpone protective measures where there is a risk of serious or irreversible environmental harm.

They should not be understood as mechanisms preventing economic development. Rather, they operate as tools for rational decision-making, requiring development choices to be based on adequate scientific information and a proper assessment of potential risks.

In the context of offshore wind projects, the application of this principle becomes particularly relevant. The environmental impacts of such projects are not necessarily limited to the immediate area where turbines are installed, but may extend to broader marine ecosystems, especially in areas of significant ecological value.

The Court adopted a strict approach regarding the timing of the application of the precautionary principle. Its reasoning is based on the view that environmental assessment cannot be postponed until a later stage, once critical decisions concerning the location and development of a project have already been taken.

The Court expressly anchored this approach in Article 24 (1) of the Greek Constitution and in the principles of prevention and precaution, noting that even research activities may affect Natura 2000 sites, migratory bird routes or other areas of particular ecological importance and therefore cannot automatically be exempt from prior environmental assessment.

The Court therefore framed the issue not as a conflict between renewable energy development and environmental protection, but as a question of the legal conditions under which the former may lawfully be pursued. In its reasoning, national and EU energy-transition objectives remain subject to prior strategic environmental assessment and integrated spatial planning, which operate as concrete expressions of the constitutional duty of environmental protection and the principles of prevention and precaution.

You can read the full article here: https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=3997c783-e87e-4277-9d4a-22a5530a3c9a

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On 20 May 2026, Greece’s Ministry of Environment and Energy published a draft Special Spatial Framework for Renewable Energy Sources (EChP-APE) for public consultation. The framework replaces the 2008 siting regime and introduces binding constraints that will reshape how photovoltaic projects are developed, valued, and transacted. With installed RES capacity at approximately 18 GW and a licensing pipeline exceeding 110 GW, the new rules create a regulatory filter that converts previously a private-law commodity—into a scarce, regulated asset.

What the Framework Does

The draft introduces two principal instruments for Photovoltaic projects (PV). First, exclusion zones prohibit new installations in Natura 2000 areas, forests, wetlands, protected areas, and archaeological zones. Second, a quantitative land-coverage cap of 1.5% per Regional Unit applies to new PV stations that have not yet obtained Environmental Terms Approval (AEPO). The framework exempts projects already in operation or in advanced permitting. Of the roughly 110 GW pipeline, approximately 70 GW are protected by transitional provisions, while around 37 GW—21 GW PV and 16 GW wind at early licensing stages—remain exposed to the new constraints.

Land as a Regulated Scarcity Asset

Irradiation and clear titles are no longer sufficient. A viable PV site must now satisfy spatial eligibility, Regional Unit capacity, environmental clearance, grid availability, and local acceptance criteria. Developers should restructure land agreements to include conditions precedent tied to spatial eligibility, cap headroom, AEPO issuance, and grid connection—with termination rights if any condition fails. Overpaying for land in Regional Units approaching the 1.5% threshold is a quantifiable bankability risk.

Permitting Status and M&A Valuation

The transitional architecture creates a valuation bifurcation. Projects with AEPO sit on the protected side: they face no re-screening, enjoy compressed timelines, and benefit from increasing scarcity value. In M&A terms, this translates into a premium reflecting reduced regulatory risk, enhanced bankability, and timeline certainty. Buyers acquire not just megawatts but regulatory optionality—the right to develop in conditions that new entrants cannot replicate.

The premium is not automatic. Acquirers should diligence whether protected status is legally robust; whether the site is in a sensitive area carrying Habitats Directive Article 6(3) or community-opposition risk; whether grid connection is credible; and whether the transitional classification will survive potential legislative amendment.

Large Groups vs. Small Producers

Vertically integrated companies benefit from mature pipelines protected by transitional provisions, internal GIS and legal capabilities, relocation flexibility, and capacity to acquire repriced portfolios. Their principal risks are reputational exposure from grandfathered projects in sensitive zones and stranded land in saturated Regional Units.

Smaller producers face disproportionate compliance costs and intensified competition for eligible land. Without reserved electrical space, priority mechanisms for energy communities, or simplified permitting for smaller installations, the framework risks accelerating market consolidation.

Grid Risk

The framework does not integrate grid capacity into spatial licensing. A project may satisfy every spatial criterion yet remain unfinanceable if it cannot secure a credible connection, faces structural curtailment, or requires co-located storage. Grid risk is now as material as permitting status to project valuation.

Practical Recommendations

PV businesses should: (1) map portfolios against exclusion zones and Regional Unit cap data; (2) classify projects by permitting status relative to the transitional line; (3) renegotiate land options to include spatial eligibility and cap-headroom conditions; (4) diligence grid connection and curtailment exposure; (5) develop a community-benefit strategy for projects above 500 kW; and (6) prepare for M&A repricing—as potential acquirers of distressed early-stage portfolios and as sellers of advanced-stage assets.

You can read the full article here: Greece’s Draft RES Spatial Framework: Why Photovoltaic Project Value Will Turn on Permitting, Land and Grid Risk – Lexology

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On 26 February 2025, the European Commission presented the “Omnibus I” package of proposals, aimed at reducing the administrative burden on businesses, strengthening the competitiveness of the European economy, and simplifying sustainability obligations without abandoning the core objectives of the European Green Deal. Proposal COM(2025) 81 is central to the reform, as it amends the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive, the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSRD and CSDDD) and related legislation. For Greek businesses, the package should be read less as a withdrawal from ESG and more as a shift toward a more proportionate, workable and commercially relevant sustainability framework.

Why does the Omnibus matter for Greek businesses?

Experience with the CSRD and CSDDD has shown that sustainability compliance can be costly, complex and resource-intensive, particularly for smaller and mid-sized undertakings. In markets such as Greece, where many businesses operate as suppliers, borrowers, sponsors, contractors or investee companies within larger European value chains, the challenge has not only been formal legal compliance, but also the indirect flow-down of ESG information requests from banks, customers, investors and public or private procurement processes.

According to the Commission, the Omnibus package is expected to deliver administrative relief of more than EUR 6 billion per year, as obligations are concentrated on businesses considered to have the greatest environmental and social impact. In practice, however, the benefit for Greek companies is likely to be relative rather than absolute: lenders, strategic customers, international groups and institutional investors are expected to continue requesting reliable ESG information through financing arrangements, supply-chain policies, investment processes and contractual undertakings.

Key proposed changes to the CSRD

The most significant change concerns the reporting framework applicable to undertakings. The proposed Directive provides that sustainability reporting obligations will apply to undertakings with more than 1,000 employees, provided they also meet the relevant financial criteria. Following the alignment of national laws, the Commission estimates that approximately 80% of companies that were expected to fall within the mandatory CSRD reporting regime will be exempted. The Omnibus proposal also provides that undertakings within the scope of the CSRD should not be able to require companies outside the Directive’s scope to provide sustainability information beyond what is set out in a simplified voluntary reporting standard.

Equally important is the simplification of the European Sustainability Reporting Standards (ESRS), with the aim of focusing on core sustainability indicators and improving proportionality without undermining the quality and comparability of disclosed information. This is particularly relevant for Greek small and medium-sized enterprises, which may not be directly in scope but may still need to respond to ESG questionnaires, onboarding requirements and tender or financing requests from larger counterparties.

The simplification also extends to the EU Taxonomy Regulation, a key tool for assessing the environmental sustainability of economic activities, including through the introduction of materiality criteria. For the Greek market, this remains relevant for bankability and investment appetite in sectors such as energy, infrastructure, real estate, transport, tourism and manufacturing, where access to financing and institutional capital increasingly depends on credible sustainability data.

Proposed recalibration of the CSDDD

The Omnibus proposal provides for the postponement of the Directive’s first application until 2028, a stronger focus of due diligence on direct business partners, the review of indirect business relationships where there are indications of heightened risk, the reduction of the frequency of risk assessments from an annual to a five-year basis, and the narrowing of certain requirements relating to stakeholder engagement and value-chain monitoring. The direction of travel is to move due diligence away from a continuous, highly expansive exercise and toward a more targeted, risk-based and manageable compliance system.

What should Greek businesses do now?

For many companies, the Omnibus represents welcome relief in terms of cost and administrative burden. The practical message for the Greek market, however, is that ESG will remain relevant where it affects financing, procurement, supply-chain access, corporate governance, M&A readiness and investor confidence. Companies should therefore focus on a proportionate ESG baseline: identify which information is actually requested by banks, customers, investors and tendering authorities; assess whether the group or its key counterparties remain in scope; and maintain a practical dataset that can be used consistently across commercial relationships.

This approach is particularly important in transactions and financing. A Greek target, borrower, sponsor or supplier that can provide concise, reliable and decision-useful ESG information is likely to be better placed in due diligence, credit approval, procurement evaluation and negotiations with international counterparties, even where it is not itself subject to full mandatory reporting.

You can read the article on Lexology here: “The EU “Omnibus I” Package: Practical Implications for the Greek Market” – Lexology

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Legal Framework and Strategic Mandate

In a decisive move from political declaration to enforceable legal action, the European Union has adopted Regulation (EU) 2026/261, setting out a structured framework for the gradual phase-out of natural gas imports from the Russian Federation. The Regulation operationalizes the strategic goals first outlined in the Versailles Declaration and the REPowerEU Plan, transforming the EU’s long-standing ambition to reduce energy dependence into legally binding obligations. This approach ensures that the Union’s energy policy is no longer a matter of voluntary political alignment but a coordinated, enforceable strategy that integrates energy security, market stability, and climate objectives.

Historical Dependencies and Geopolitical Imperatives

 The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine starkly exposed Europe’s structural energy vulnerabilities. For decades, the EU relied heavily on Russian pipeline gas under long-term contracts, a dependence that proved economically destabilizing and politically risky once gas supply became a tool of coercion. Previous disruptions, notably in 2006 and 2009, along with supply constraints following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, highlight a recurring pattern of market manipulation. The undercapacity of storage facilities and extreme price volatility in 2022 further confirmed that even residual Russian volumes pose systemic risks to inflation control, market stability, and social cohesion. Regulation 2026/261 addresses these vulnerabilities by codifying a phased elimination of Russian gas, signaling a structural shift in European energy governance.

Phased Elimination and Contractual Safeguards

The Regulation establishes a staggered phase-out schedule, carefully tailored according to delivery method and contract duration. Imports of Russian LNG under short-term contracts concluded before 17 June 2025 are prohibited from 25 April 2026, while short-term pipeline gas contracts signed before the same date face a ban starting 17 June 2026. Long-term contracts exceeding one year, concluded before 17 June 2025, are phased out more gradually: LNG imports cease from 1 January 2027, and pipeline gas imports from 30 September 2027. A narrowly defined safeguard allows the Commission to extend the final pipeline deadline until 1 November 2027 for a Member State demonstrating objective supply risks, ensuring continuity without compromising market integrity.

The transitional regime is deliberately restrictive. Only contracts concluded before 17 June 2025 benefit from the phased timetable, and amendments are permitted solely for operational, administrative, corporate, or quantity-reducing purposes. Any modification that increases volumes, extends delivery periods, or expands the economic scope of a contract is treated as a new agreement and falls immediately under the prohibition. This carefully calibrated mechanism prevents artificial restructuring aimed at circumventing deadlines, while allowing necessary technical adjustments during the wind-down period.

Authorization, Monitoring, and National Diversification

Beyond prohibitions, the Regulation introduces a comprehensive prior authorization system. From February 2026 onward, importers must secure authorization from national authorities before releasing gas for free circulation. Detailed documentation regarding origin, production location, contractual terms, and infrastructure bookings must be submitted, enabling effective traceability and enforcement. Customs authorities are empowered to refuse release where sufficient evidence is lacking, complementing the prohibition with a robust monitoring architecture designed to prevent re-routing, relabeling, or indirect participation through third countries.

Member States are also required to develop National Diversification Plans, detailing measures to ensure security of supply during and after the phase-out. These plans must address demand reduction strategies, integration of renewable gases such as biomethane and hydrogen, infrastructure adaptation, and alternative sourcing routes. The broader objective is not merely substitution but structural diversification, embedding the phase-out within a framework of energy solidarity and coordinated EU-wide action rather than fragmented national approaches.

You can read the article on Lexology here:

The EU Strategy for the Gradual Phase-Out of Russian Natural Gas and the Strategic Role of LNG Infrastructure

The full article is available here: The EU Strategy for the Gradual Phase-Out of Russian Natural Gas and the Strategic Role of LNG Infrastructure

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“Europe’s New Energy Arteries: ACER’s Roadmap for the TEN-E Revision”

(Article drafted by Kosmas Karanikolas, Senior Associate, and Ioanna Toufexi, Associate, for Lexology on November 20, 2025)

Introduction: Europe’s Energy System in Transformation

The European Union is entering a new era of energy transformation. Electrification, green industry, hydrogen, and renewable energy sources are rapidly increasing the demand for stronger, smarter, and more interconnected grids.

Europe is confronted with a historic energy challenge. On one hand, it is committed to achieving climate neutrality; on the other, it must develop networks capable of supporting billions of new electric devices, millions of electric vehicles, data centers and an entirely new hydrogen economy.

The current legal framework governing Europe’s energy networks — particularly the TEN-E Regulation — is now widely viewed as complex, slow, and difficult to implement. For this reason, the European Commission is preparing a new European Grid Package for 2025.

In this context, ACER, the European Union Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators, has published detailed proposals outlining how the existing framework should be revised.

The Issue: A Slow and Fragmented Planning Framework

ACER is clearly stated that today’s legal framework is excessively complex, burdened with consultations, steps, and procedures that delay the planning of critical infrastructure.

At present, building a high-voltage line or a hydrogen pipeline requires navigating a long chain of prerequisites: extensive scenario cycles, highly complex ten-year network development plans (TYNDPs), slow procedures for selecting Projects of Common Interest (PCIs), and a labyrinth of assessments and approvals.

The result is that planning is so delayed that projects often materialize only when the market has already moved on.

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“Bulgaria launches Second Tender for EU-funded 1,900 MWh Standalone Battery Storage Facilities (RESTORE 2)”

(Article drafted by Daniela Dzabarova, Senior Associate, and Desislava Dimitrova, Senior Associate, for Lexology on September 30, 2025)

Introduction

On 19 September 2025, the Bulgarian Ministry of Energy announced the commencement of the second tender under the National Infrastructure for Storage of Electricity from Renewable Sources – RESTORE 2 program (the “Procedure”). The Procedure is designed to provide financial support for the construction and commissioning of a standalone Battery Energy Storage System (BESS), financed under the EU’s Recovery and Resilience Facility. Under the first RESTORE procedure, 82 projects were approved, with total funding of BGN 1.149 billion.

Legal and Regulatory Framework

The Procedure is conducted in accordance with the state aid scheme approved by European Commission Decision SA.114306 (2024/N): State Aid Scheme for Supporting the Development of Standalone Energy Storage Facilities. It also aligns with Section 2.5.1, Point 77, Letter a), Subpoint (ii) of the European Commission Communication on the Temporary Framework for State Aid Measures to Support the Economy in the Context of the Crisis and Transition Related to the Aggression of Russia Against Ukraine (2023/C 101/03) and its subsequent amendments.

Procedure Objectives

The Procedure aims to provide funding for the construction and commissioning of at least 1,900 MWh of standalone Battery Energy Storage capacity. The storage facilities will be distributed across Bulgaria and connected either to the transmission network operated by TSO EAD or to the  distribution network, provided that they maintain a direct optical connection to TSO EAD’s SCADA/EMS telecommunication system.

You can read the article on Lexology here:

 Bulgaria launches Second Tender for EU-funded 1,900 MWh Standalone Battery Storage Facilities (RESTORE 2) – Lexology

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“A New Chapter in Green Energy: The New Law on Hydrogen Production in Greece”

(Article drafted by Ioanna Toufexi, Associate, and Mara Vasileiou, Associate, for Lexology on September 19, 2025)

The New Law and its Key Objectives

In alignment with European Union’s policies on green development, Greece, through the adoption of Law 5215/2025 introduces a comprehensive regulatory framework for the hydrogen market, establishing coherent provisions for the production of biomethane and hydrogen. The law defines both the licensing procedures for production plants and the injection of their production into the National Natural Gas System (ESFA) or the Natural Gas Distribution Systems, as well as the supply of the produced gases to end-users not connected to the System or Distribution Networks and their use as transport fuels.

“Νέο Κεφάλαιο στην Πράσινη Ενέργεια: Ο Νέος Νόμος για την παραγωγή υδρογόνου στην Ελλάδα”

Ο νέος νόμος και οι βασικοί στόχοι του

Η Ελλάδα, εναρμονιζόμενη με τις ενωσιακές πολιτικές για την πράσινη ανάπτυξη, με την υιοθέτηση του ν. 5215/2025, εισάγει ένα πλήρες ρυθμιστικό πλαίσιο για την αγορά υδρογόνου στη χώρα, θεσπίζοντας συνεκτικές ρυθμίσεις για την παραγωγή βιομεθανίου και υδρογόνου, οι οποίες καθορίζουν τόσο τη διαδικασία αδειοδότησης των μονάδων και την έγχυση της παραγωγής τους στο Εθνικό Σύστημα Φυσικού Αερίου (Ε.Σ.Φ.Α.) ή στα Δίκτυα Διανομής Φυσικού Αερίου (Δίκτυα Διανομής), όσο και τη διάθεση των παραγόμενων αερίων σε τελικούς πελάτες που δεν συνδέονται με το Σύστημα ή τα Δίκτυα Διανομής και τη χρήση τους ως καυσίμων κίνησης.

You can read the whole article on Lexology here:

A New Chapter in Green Energy: The New Law on Hydrogen Production in Greece

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“RAAEY’s Decision E-65/2025: A Regulatory Milestone for Greece’s Entry into the New Energy Storage Era”

(Article drafted by Ioanna Toufexi, Associate, and Andreas Papastathis, Partner, for Lexology on September 5, 2025)

The recent Decision E-65/2025 of the Greek Regulatory Authority for Waste, Energy, and Water (RAAEW) marks a decisive step in Greece’s energy transition, as it introduces for the first time a comprehensive methodology for calculating annual operational support for electricity storage projects starting operations from January 2026. This landmark decision not only completes the national regulatory framework for storage but also aligns fully with EU state aid rules, the CEEAG 2022 Guidelines, and Greece’s National Energy and Climate Plan.

By introducing the concept of “Reference Revenue” and linking support mechanisms to actual market performance, the framework ensures both the financial sustainability of storage investments and their active participation in the electricity market, particularly in balancing services. At the same time, it mitigates risks from market volatility, reduces curtailment of renewable production, and enhances system security.

While the methodology brings innovation and strong investment incentives, it also introduces new challenges, such as administrative complexity and compliance with performance benchmarks. Nevertheless, Decision E-65/2025 represents a regulatory milestone that balances investment stability with market discipline, paving the way for Greece’s entry into a new era of energy storage and renewable integration.

You can read the full article on Lexology: “RAAEY’S Decision E-65/2025: A Regulatory Milestone for Greece’s Entry into the New Energy Storage Era”

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The post RAAEY’s Decision E-65/2025: A Regulatory Milestone for Greece’s Entry into the New Energy Storage Era (Απόφαση ΡΑΑΕΥ Ε-65/2025: Ένα ρυθμιστικό ορόσημο για την είσοδο της Ελλάδας στη νέα ενεργειακή εποχή) appeared first on Rokas Law Firm.

Law 5215/2025: A Bold Reset for Landmark Investments in Renewable Energy, Innovation & Competitiveness

(Article drafted by Mara Vasileiou & Eva Kotzairaki, Associates for Lexology on July 24, 2025)

Greece has introduced Law 5215/2025, amending Law 4684/2021, to enhance the national framework for “Landmark Investments of Outstanding Significance.” The new legal framework is designed to attract large-scale strategic projects that contribute meaningfully to sustainable development, green and digital transition, technological innovation, and the competitiveness of the Greek economy.

Expanded Scope for Landmark Investments

The law broadens the definition of eligible investments, placing emphasis on:

• Renewable energy infrastructure, especially those combining power generation with renewable hydrogen production.
• Offshore wind farms, floating photovoltaic parks, and the circular economy.
• Strategic sectors such as critical raw materials, shipbuilding, and low-carbon technologies.

A key update is the shift from the term “green” to “renewable” hydrogen, reinforcing the legislative focus on renewable energy sources and expanding the scope for state aid.

Enhanced Incentive Mechanisms

Landmark investments may now benefit from a wide range of incentives under Articles 7–10 of Law 4864/2021, including:

• Spatial planning incentive (automatically granted for site preparation and related studies).
• Fast-track licensing procedures.
• Tax incentives, including:
  • Fixed corporate tax rate for 12 years.
  • Tax-exempt reserves (taxed only upon distribution).
  • Accelerated depreciation of up to 100% (with a cap at 40% depreciation rate).
• State aid covering up to 100% of R&D and employment-related expenses.

Flexible Timelines and Implementation Framework

Recognizing the long-term and complex nature of such investments, the law replaces the fixed December 31, 2025 deadline with project-specific timelines aligned with the funding instruments involved (e.g., RRF, NSRF 2021–2027). Investors must declare the intended completion date in their application, and failure to meet this deadline results in the revocation of incentives.

Inclusion of new projects under this framework is allowed until funding resources (from EU and national programs) are exhausted, provided budgetary constraints under the Public Investment Program and the Medium-Term Fiscal Strategy are respected.

Additional Support for Key Regions and Crisis Recovery

• In De-lignification Zones (DEZs), investments can receive up to 100% of the aid intensity permitted by EU Regulation 651/2014.
• Projects falling under the Temporary Crisis and Transition Framework (TCTF)—adopted following the Ukraine crisis—may also receive full state aid, regardless of location, subject to EU state aid rules.

Conclusion

Law 5215/2025 represents a significant legislative step toward making Greece a destination for high-impact, future-facing investments. By clarifying priority sectors, expanding the eligible investment scope, and offering robust financial and regulatory incentives, the law creates a compelling framework for strategic investors committed to sustainability, innovation, and long-term economic growth.

Read the full article here: Law 5215/2025: A Bold Reset for Landmark Investments in Renewable Energy, Innovation & Competitiveness – Lexology

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